Adversarial training was recently shown to be competitive against supervised learning methods on computer vision tasks, however, studies have mainly been confined to generative tasks such as image synthesis. In this paper, we apply adversarial training techniques to the discriminative task of learning a steganographic algorithm. Steganography is a collection of techniques for concealing information by embedding it within a non-secret medium, such as cover texts or images. We show that adversarial training can produce robust steganographic techniques: our unsupervised training scheme produces a steganographic algorithm that competes with state-of-the-art steganographic techniques, and produces a robust steganalyzer, which performs the discriminative task of deciding if an image contains secret information. We define a game between three parties, Alice, Bob and Eve, in order to simultaneously train both a steganographic algorithm and a steganalyzer. Alice and Bob attempt to communicate a secret message contained within an image, while Eve eavesdrops on their conversation and attempts to determine if secret information is embedded within the image. We represent Alice, Bob and Eve by neural networks, and validate our scheme on two independent image datasets, showing our novel method of studying steganographic problems is surprisingly competitive against established steganographic techniques.
Introduction
Steganography and cryptography both provide methods for secret communication. Authenticity and integrity of communications are central aims of modern cryptography. However, cryptographic schemes do not aim to hide the presence secret communications. Steganography conceals the presence of a message by embedding it within a communication the adversary does not deem suspicious. Recent details of mass surveillance programs have shown that meta-data of communications can lead to devastating privacy leakages 1 . NSA officials have stated that they "kill people based on meta-data" (Hayden, 2014) ; the mere presence of a secret communication can have life or death consequences even if the content is not known. Concealing both the content as well as the presence of a message is necessary for privacy sensitive communication. Steganographic algorithms are designed to hide information within a cover message such that the cover message appears unaltered to an external adversary. A great deal of effort is afforded to designing steganographic algorithms that minimize the perturbations within a cover message when a secret message is embedded within, while allowing for recovery of the secret message. In this work we ask if a steganographic algorithm can be learned in an unsupervised manner, without human domain knowledge.
For the unsupervised design of steganographic techniques, we leverage ideas from the field of adversarial training (Goodfellow et al., 2014) . Typically, adversarial training is used to train generative models on tasks such as image generation and speech synthesis. We design a scheme that aims to embed a secret message within an image. Since there are a great number of publicly available images on the internet, the communicating parties do not need to use a model that generates images. Our task is discriminative, the embedding algorithm takes in a cover image and produces a steganographic image, while the adversary tries to learn weaknesses in the embedding algorithm, resulting in the ability to separate cover images from steganographic images, a binary decision.
Steganographic algorithms are normally combined with a shared key; only the two communicating parties, Alice and Bob, should be able to decrypt the secret message. With our scheme, two parties do not have to establish shared keys. They must simply agree on a set of training images and train the same model separately from their respective lo-cations. Alice can then embed her secret message within a cover image, and Bob can decode the message upon receiving the steganographic image sent by Alice. Our scheme removes shared keys by relying on the ability for independent parties to learn the same model weights.
In this paper, we introduce the first steganographic algorithm produced entirely in an unsupervised manner, through a novel adversarial training scheme. Additionally, we show the steganalyzer, Eve, produced through this scheme can also compete against state-of-the-art methods.
Related Work

Adversarial Learning
Adversarial learning draws on game theory to jointly train models in an unsupervised manner. Independent models are trained to compete against one another, iteratively improving the output of each model. In Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) (Goodfellow et al., 2014) , a generative model, G, is pitted against a discriminative model, D. Give a dataset, G tries to map noise to samples from the dataset, while D tries to distinguish between outputs of G and real data samples. By updating G's weights based on the success of fooling D, and updating D's based on the success of distinguishing fake from real samples, G learns to produce samples that are perceptually indistinguishable from samples from the dataset.
GANs have been successfully applied to image generation tasks (Radford et al., 2015) using convolutional neural networks (CNNs) for both G and D. CNNs are popular in supervised learning settings due to their success in computer vision applications (Krizhevsky et al., 2012; Oquab et al., 2014; Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014) . By further refining the process of combining a GAN architecture with CNNs, (Ledig et al., 2016) produced images that are almost indistinguishable from real images. Traditional GANs are considered difficult to train as there is no noticeable link between convergence of the loss functions and sample quality. It is common that a practitioner chooses to stop training by visual inspection of generated samples. A recent design, WGAN (Arjovsky et al., 2017) , uses the Wasserstein distance instead instead of Jensen-Shannon divergence to compare the dataset distribution with the learned distribution from G. They show training improvements where convergence does correlate with sample quality.
Two recent designs have applied adversarial training to cryptographic and steganographic problems. In (Abadi & Andersen, 2016) , adversarial training is used to teach two neural networks to encrypt a short message, that fools a discriminator. However, no experimental or theoretical evaluation was performed to show that the encryption scheme is computationally difficult to break, nor is there evidence that this encryption scheme is competitive against readily available public key encryption schemes. Adversarial training has also been applied to steganography (Denis Volkhonskiy & Burnaev, 2016) , but in a different way to our scheme. Whereas we seek to train a model that learns a steganographic technique by itself, Volkhonskiy et al's. work augments the original GAN process to generate images which are more susceptible to a known steganographic algorithm. In addition to the normal GAN discriminator, they introduce a steganalyzer that receives examples from the generator that may or may not contain secret messages. The generator learns to generate realistic images by fooling the discriminator of the GAN, and learns to be a secure container by fooling the steganalyzer. However, they do not measure performance against state-of-the-art steganographic techniques making it difficult to estimate the practicality of their scheme.
Steganography
Steganography research can be split into two subfields: the study of steganographic algorithms and the study of steganalyzers. Research into steganographic algorithms concentrates on finding methods to embed secret information within a medium while minimizing the perturbations within that medium. Steganalysis research seeks to discover methods to detect such perturbations. Steganalysis is a binary classification task: discovering whether or not secret information is present with a message, and so machine learning classifiers are commonly used as steganalyzers.
Least significant bit (LSB) (Mielikainen, 2006 ) is a simple steganographic algorithm used to embed a secret message within a cover image. Each pixel in an image is made up of three RGB color channels (or one for grayscale images), and each color channel is represented by a number of bits. For example, it is common to represent a pixel in a grayscale image with an 8-bit binary sequence. The LSB technique then replaces the least significant bits of the cover image by the bits of the secret message. By only manipulating the least significant bits of the cover image, the variation in color of the original image is minimized. However, information from the original image is always lost when using the LSB technique, and is known to be vulnerable to steganalysis (Fridrich et al., 2001 ).
Most steganographic schemes for images use a distortion function that forces the embedding process to be localized to parts of the image that are considered noisy or difficult to model. Advanced steganographic algorithms attempt to minimize the distortion function between a cover image, C, and a steganographic image, C , a pixel, which changes for different steganographic algorithms.
HUGO (Pevnỳ et al., 2010 ) is a steganographic scheme that defines a distortion function domain by assigning costs to pixels based on the effect of embedding some information within a pixel, the space of pixels is condensed into a feature space using a weighted norm function. HUGO is considered to be one of the most secure steganographic techniques.
WOW (Wavelet Obtained Weights) (Holub & Fridrich, 2012) is another advanced steganographic method that embeds information into a cover image according to regions of complexity. If a region of an image is more texturally complex than another, the more pixel values within that region will be modified.
Finally, S-UNIWARD (Holub et al., 2014) proposes a universal distortion function that is agnostic to the embedding domain. However, the end goal is much the same: to minimize this distortion function, and embed information in noisy regions or complex textures, avoiding smooth regions of the cover images.
In Section 4.2, we compare out results against a stateof-the-art steganalyzer, ATS (Lerch-Hostalot & Megías, 2016) . ATS uses labelled data to build artificial training sets of cover and steganographic images, and is trained using an SVM with a Gaussian kernel. They show that this technique outperforms other popular steganalysis tools.
Steganographic Adversarial Training
This section discusses our steganographic scheme, the models we use and the information each party wishes to conceal or reveal. After laying this theoretical groundwork, we present experiments supporting our claims.
Learning Objectives
Our training scheme involves three parties: Alice, Bob and Eve. Alice sends a message to Bob, Eve can eavesdrop on the link between Alice and Bob and would like to discover if there is a secret message embedded within their communication. In classical steganography, Eve (the Steganalyzer) is passed both unaltered images, called cover images, and images with secret messages embedded within, called steganographic images. Given an image, Eve places a confidence score of how likely this is a cover or steganographic image. Alice embeds a secret message within the cover image, producing a steganographic image, and passes this to Bob. Bob knows the embedding process and so can recover the message. In our scheme, Alice, Bob and Eve are neural networks. Alice is trained to learn how produce a steganographic image such that Bob can recover the secret message, and such that Eve can do no better than randomly guess if a sample is a cover or steganographic image.
The full scheme is depicted in Figure 1 : Alice receives a cover image, C, and a secret message, M , as inputs. Alice outputs a steganographic image, C , which is given to both Bob and Eve. Bob outputs M , the secret message he attempts to recover from C . We say Bob performs perfectly if M = M . In addition to the steganographic images, Eve also receives the cover images. Given an input X, Eve outputs the probability, p, that X = C. Alice tries to learn an embedding scheme such that Eve always outputs p = 1 2 . We do not train Eve to maximize her prediction error, since she can then simply flip her decision and perform with perfect classification accuracy.
At the beginning of training, a human can easily separate cover images from steganographic images, as Alice has not learned yet how to embed the secret message such that there is no visible difference in the cover image. However, we train Eve much like a discriminator in a GAN, where we tie her predictive power to the embedding capacity of Alice. When Alice produces a steganographic image that does not resemble the cover image, Eve does not have the ability to perfectly separate cover from steganographic images. As training continues, Eve becomes better at her task, but then so does Alice as her weights are updated, in part, based on the loss of Eve.
Similarly to (Abadi & Andersen, 2016) , we let θ A , θ B , θ C denote the parameters of Alice, Bob and Eve, respectively. We write A(θ A , C, M ) for Alice's output on C and M , B(θ b , C ) for Bob's output on C , and E(θ E , C, C ) for Eve's output on C and C . Let L A , L B , L C denote the loss of Alice, Bob and Eve, respectively. Then, we have the following relations:
We set Bob's loss (the secret message reconstruction loss), to be the Euclidean distance between M and M :
As is common with GAN discriminator implementations, we set the Eve's loss to be sigmoid cross entropy loss:
where y = 0 if x = C and y = 1 if x = C.
Alice's loss is given as a weighted sum of Bob's loss, Eve's loss on steganographic images, and an additional reconstructive loss term:
where d(C, C ) is the Euclidean distance between the cover image and the steganographic image, and λ A , λ B , λ E ∈ R define the weight given to each respective loss term.
Our goal is not only to explore whether neural networks can produce steganographic embedding algorithms in an unsupervised manner, but whether they are competitive against steganographic algorithms like HUGO, WOW and S-UNIWARD, that have been designed by steganography experts. We did not intend to encode a specific algorithm within the neural network, rather we would like to give the networks the opportunity to devise their own.
Architecture
Alice (Steganographic Encoder). Alice accepts as input a cover image and a random n-bit binary message. The cover image is flattened and concatenated with the secret message, which is then fed into the neural network. Each layer is fully connected to the next, allowing the secret message to be combined with any region of the cover image. We would like the locality of the embedding process to be learned instead of fixed. The first hidden layer feeds into twice the number of hidden units as the length of the flattened cover image. The architecture continues in this way: fully connected layers with twice the number of hidden units as the previous layer. Batch normalization is implemented at each layer, and dropout with an activation probability of 0.5 is implemented in the second layer. After reaching a hidden layer where the number of units totals eight times the length of the flattened cover image, the model decreases the number of units in each layer, halving from one layer to the next. The final layer reshapes the input to an image with the dimensions of the original cover image. ReLU (Nair & Hinton, 2010 ) is used as an activation function in all but the final layer, where tanh (LeCun et al., 2012) is used.
Bob (Steganographic Decoder). Bob accepts as input the steganographic image output by Alice. Bob uses a deep convolutional architecture to extract the important bits from the output of Alice. It is made up of four convolutional layers and one final fully connected layer. Leaky ReLU (Maas et al., 2013 ) is used in all but the final layer, where tanh is used. Batch normalization is applied at each layer.
Eve (Steganalyzer). Eve accepts as input both cover images and steganographic images. Eve has a similar architecture to Bob but uses the sigmoid activation function instead of tanh at the final layer to output probabilities from the logits.
Experiments
As a proof of concept, we implemented our adversarial training scheme on two image datasets: celebrity faces in the wild (celebA) (Liu et al., 2015) and a standard steganography research dataset, BOSS 2 . We concatenate an n-bit random message, with each sample of each dataset. We vary the size of the message, n, to test the limits of the amount of information that can be effectively hidden inside a cover image. This corresponds to the number of bits per pixel (bpp) that can be hidden by a steganographic algorithm, a common measure of the success of a steganographic algorithm. On average, steganographic algorithms can successfully hide approximately 0.4bpp. Our datasets are formed of 32 × 32 pixel images, and so we vary n from 100 to 400, this corresponds to hiding between approximately 0.1bpp to 0.4bpp. We intentionally randomize the secret message so that the network does not learn a specific function associated with a specific group of messages. We want to be sure that our model can generalize to any message that is less than n bits. For each experiment, we performed grid search to find the optimum loss weights, λ A , λ B , λ E , for Alice. All experiments were performed in TensorFlow (Abadi et al., 2016a; b) , on a workstation with a Tesla K40 GPU card 3 .
(a) Cover images. We first motivate our work by showing our model can produce steganographic images that are almost indistinguishable from the cover images. We vary the size of the embedded secret message, to explore how many bits may be stored in a cover image while remaining undetected by a steganalyzer. As expected, we find that a larger perturbation in the cover image results in more communicated bits but carries a greater risk of detection.
The celebA dataset consists of 202, 599 images of celebrity faces from 10, 177 unique identities. We trained in batches of 32, and use the Adam optimizer (Kingma & Ba, 2014) with a learning rate of 2 · 10 −4 . At each batch we alternate training either Alice and Bob, or Eve. Figure 2b and Figure 2c shows the steganographic images output by Alice after training for 500 steps, for embedding rates of 0.1bpp and 0.4bpp, respectively. Our scheme easily copes with an embedding rate of 0.1bpp for a 32 × 32 image, which is equivalent to communicating a short 12 character ASCII message. Figure 3a and Figure 3c shows the training loss of each party, and the success of Bob decoding the secret message over time, respectively. In the first few rounds of training, the visual quality of Alice's output is low and Bob is essentially randomly guessing the message. After approximately 50 steps, Alice begins learns to successfully embed information in a cover image such that Eve is fooled, and Bob learns to correctly decode the message. After 500 training steps, Bob decodes the message with an average success of 99.8%, while Eve's loss remains the same. Figure 3b and Figure 3d show similar results, with both sample quality and success of decoding both high by the end of training. Concealing 0.4bpp corresponds to successfully hiding a message of 51 ASCII characters. Due to the larger amount of information communicated between Alice and Bob, it takes a longer period of time for Alice to discover an effective embedding scheme, and for Bob to correctly discover the secret message. After 500 training steps, Bob can successfully decode 84% of the message.
There is no noticeable image quality decrease between 0.1bpp and 0.4bpp, however we found after 0.4bpp, image quality suffered and it was no longer possible to balance realistic image creation capable of fooling Eve, and convergence of message decoding.
For both embedding rates of 0.1bpp and 0.4bpp, Eve's loss remained constant at approximately 1.4. Eve's loss is the sum of losses on both steganographic images and cover images, which both remained steady at approximately 0.69. Due to the logarithmic term in the loss function, this is equivalent to randomly guessing if an image carries a secret message. 
BOSS dataset
In addition to our experiments on the celebA dataset, we trained our steganographic scheme on the BOSS image dataset, which is commonly used as a benchmark in steganography research. BOSS is made up of 10, 000 grayscale images depicting a variety of scenes such as landscapes, buildings and animals. We expected our scheme to perform worse than on the celebA dataset, since the cover images do not come from a single probability distribution. However, we found our scheme is still capable of embedding secret information successfully.
Fooling a steganalyzer, Eve, is easy by design, since we train in such a way that Eve never has a competitive advantage. Thus, we additionally show that the resultant trained steganographic model, Alice, can fool an independent steganalyzer. We compare our scheme against both stateof-the-art steganographic algorithms and steganalysis tools and show that it performs competitively. Figure 4b shows the sample quality of steganographic images with an embedding rate of 0.1bpp, while Figure 4c and Figure 4d show the error rates of Alice, Bob and Eve, and the success of Bob decoding the secret message, respectively. While image quality suffers slightly more than on the celebA dataset, our scheme is still able to learn a steganographic algorithm. Our scheme is able to output samples that are not dissimilar from the original dataset, while Bob is able to learn to successfully decode the message. Alice and Bob both learn their respective tasks in a relatively short period of time, after which there is not much improvement in terms of hiding or recovering the secret message. At the end of training, Bob is able to successfully decode the secret message with 97% accuracy.
We compare our scheme against steganographic algorithms HUGO, WOW and S-UNIWARD, and against the steganalyzer ATS in Table 1 . We split the BOSS image dataset in half creating a training set and a test set. Alice was then trained on the 5000 samples from the training set. We then created an additional 10, 000 steganographic images for each steganographic algorithm (Alice, HUGO, WOW and S-UNIWARD). Now each steganographic algorithm has an associated training set and test set, each consisting of 5000 cover images and 5000 steganographic images. For each steganographic algorithm we train both ATS and Eve on the associated training set, and then report accuracy of the steganalyzer on the test set. Eve was implemented from scratch as a supervised standalone model, to show that there is enough expressivity in the model to distinguish between steganographic images and cover images, and thus, contribute to learning in our scheme.
From Table 1 , Eve performs competitively against the steganalyzer, ATS, and Alice also performs well against other steganographic techniques. While our scheme does not substantially improve on current popular steganographic methods, it is clear that it does not perform significantly worse, and that unsupervised training methods are capable of competing with expert domain knowledge.
Discussion & Conclusion
By leveraging adversarial training games, we confirm that neural networks are able to discover steganographic algorithms, and furthermore, these steganographic algorithms perform well against state-of-the-art techniques. Our scheme does not require domain knowledge for designing steganographic schemes. We model the attacker as another neural network and show that this attacker has enough expressivity to perform well against a state-of-the-art steganalyzer.
We expect our scheme to offer an alternative to other practical steganographic tools. Prior to this, communicating parties would have to agree on a steganographic algorithm and establish shared keys. Both of which, if discovered by an adversary, could lead to a loss of privacy. Our scheme requires two parties to decide upon a set of images from which the model will be trained, this decision could easily be communicated using conventional cryptographic methods. Now, the two communicating parties can both train their models on the agreed set of images, and be confident the other party will learn the same embedding and decoding processes, without the requirement of a shared key.
We expect this work to lead to fruitful avenues of further research. Finding the balance between cover image reconstruction loss, Bob's loss and Eve's loss to discover an effective embedding scheme is currently done via grid search, which is a time consuming process. Discovering a more refined method would greatly improve the efficiency of the training process. Indeed, discovering a method to quickly check whether the cover image has the capacity to accept a secret message would be a great improvement over the trial-and-error approach currently implemented. It also became clear that Alice and Bob learn their tasks after a relatively small number of training steps, further research is needed to explore if Alice and Bob fail to improve due to limitations in the model or because of shortcomings in the training scheme.
